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INTRODUCTION
In the early fall of 1987, the inequities and inconsistencies of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA) appellate proce-
dures became vividly apparent. For example, a University of Pitts-
burgh offensive back who had lost his eligibility because he had ac-
cepted $2,500 from an agent, was, after appeal to the NCAA,
restored to full eligibility.' A University of Auburn quarterback who
was declared ineligible because he was bailed out of jail by his assis-
tant coach, was, after appeal, restored to eligible status with a mere
two game suspension.' A University of Minnesota quarterback who
earlier had lost his eligibility because he had accepted a plane ticket
from his assistant coach, was, after appeal, reinstated with only a
two game suspension.3 Although these decisions are consistent, they
should be compared to an NCAA decision in another case. An Iowa
State University volleyball player who was declared ineligible by the
NCAA because she mistakenly took her college entrance exam on
the wrong day4 was denied an appeal altogether.5 As of the time the
football players were reinstated, she had yet to receive the chance to
air her grievance.
1. Wulf, Spiked, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 28, 1987, at 9.
2. id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Tracy Graham took the ACT college entrance exam on a date not approved
by the NCAA. She was a B student in high school, and took the ACT in July of 1986
because she was competing for her track team on the nationally approved testing date in
April of 1986. The NCAA requires that prospective athletes take their entrance exams
on national testing days so it can better monitor the results. Id. at 9-12.
5. Id. at 12. After a considerable amount of time had passed, and under much
pressure due to great publicity, the NCAA Council finally agreed to review Ms. Gra-
ham's case. See Ballard, Common Sense, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 25, 1988, at 7. Of
course, Ms. Graham had already lost a great deal of time in which she could have been
playing for Iowa State.
These inconsistent and seemingly unfair results6 are an example of
the "inconsistencies inherent in the labyrinthine committee structure
of the NCAA. ' '7 However, these procedures shall remain unchecked.
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court held in NCAA v.
Tarkanian8 that the NCAA is not amenable to the constitutional
restraints of the fourteenth amendment. Specifically, the Court
found that the NCAA's action is not state action, a requirement nec-
essary to invoke the fourteenth amendment.9 Prior to the Court's de-
cision, lower state and federal courts sharply differed in their treat-
ment of whether the NCAA was a "state actor,"'10 and thus subject
to the demands of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court
has finalized the debate with its decision in NCAA v. Tarkanian.
This Note will address the significance of the Court's finding that
the NCAA is not a state actor within the fourteenth amendment. It
argues that adherence to this rule may lead to an inequitable and
inadequate procedure for student athletes and member schools. Sec-
tion I examines the history of the state action doctrine as it has ap-
plied to the NCAA. Section II reviews the structure of the NCAA
and introduces the facts of NCAA v. Tarkanian. Section III presents
the Supreme Court's reasoning in reaching its decision that the
6. One might wonder why students who take money from agents, get bailed out of
jail by their coaches, or accept gifts from their coaches are treated much more leniently
than those who make innocent or harmless mistakes. For another account of some ques-
tionable disciplinary actions by the NCAA, see Neff, Judgment Calls, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, Sept. 15, 1986, at 21.
7. Wulf, supra note 1, at 9-12.
8. 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
9. The fourteenth amendment states, in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v.
Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 803 (1982);
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
10. Until the Tarkanian decision, the Supreme Court had never addressed the is-
sue of whether the NCAA was a state actor. However, lower federal courts had dealt
with this question for many years. Initially, the courts of appeals held that the NCAA
was a state actor for constitutional claims. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Minn. v.
NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977); Howard Univ. v.
NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir 1975); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975);
Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974). The tide turned in
the 1980s, and the courts of appeals have since consistently held to the contrary. See,
e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Karmanos v. Baker, 816
F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986); Arlosoroff v.
NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984). However, the Supreme Court of Nevada held
the NCAA to be a state actor in Tarkanian v. NCAA, 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345
(1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988), thus giving the opportunity to the United States
Supreme Court to review the issue, which resulted in the decision of NCAA v.
Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
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NCAA is not a state actor. Section IV presents opposing arguments,
and section V concludes this Note with a presentation of viable alter-
natives for those members seeking fair procedural treatment when
involved with the NCAA.
I. HISTORY OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO THE
NCAA IN LOWER STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
A. Development of the State Action Doctrine
The constitutional restraints of the fourteenth amendment are ap-
plicable only to state action."1 State action is usually governmental
action, but it may also occur when a private actor acts in concert
with a state. The United States Supreme Court has not set down a
specific set of rules to determine when the degree of state involve-
ment is sufficient to convert a private person's conduct into state ac-
tion. Instead, each case is usually judged on its own facts on a case
by case basis. 2
The first significant set of decisions of the United States Supreme
Court regarding the state action doctrine were The Civil Rights
Cases,'" in which the Court held that conduct which is exclusively
private is not governed by the fourteenth amendment. The Court
said the guarantees of equal protection and due process apply only to
state action.' 4 Acts by a state government are clearly state actions.
However, less clear are those cases where a private entity acts in
concert with a state government. The Supreme Court developed two
theories to explain when particular private conduct that is closely
linked to official conduct should be considered state action. The first
theory is the public function approach,'5 in which the private activ-
ity is attributed to the government because the private actor fulfills a
11. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. By its express terms, the Constitu-
tion makes it clear that its equal protection and due process guarantees will only apply to
governmental actions. However, as will be discussed ii this section, the term "state" has
been interpreted by courts to include organizations which are connected with state ac-
tion, thereby making them amenable to the fourteenth amendment constraints.
12. The presence of state action in a particular case depends upon its unique facts
and circumstances. As Justice Clark said, "[o]wing to the very 'largeness' of government,
a multitude of relationships might appear to some to fall within the Amendment's em-
brace, but that, it must be remembered, can be determined only in the framework of the
peculiar facts or circumstances present." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715, 725-26 (1961).
13. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
14. Id. at 11.
15. See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
public function. The second theory is the nexus or entanglement ap-
proach,6 in which the connections between the state and the private
actor are so great that the state can be said to be involved in (or
even to have encouraged) the private activity which is claimed to be
violative of the Constitution.
1. Public Function Approach
The public function approach posits that when a private entity is
entrusted by the state with the performance of functions that are
governmental in nature, it becomes an agent of the state and its acts
constitute state action.1" The Court has held that when a facility is
built and operated primarily to benefit the public, and when its oper-
ation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state
regulation. 8
This approach, however, is restricted to those functions which be-
long exclusively to the state.'9 The application of the public function
analysis is thus limited to those circumstances where the function
performed is one which is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the state, and where the state is actually required to perform the
function.20
2. Nexus or Entanglement Approach
The nexus theory posits that if the government is sufficiently in-
volved in the private actor's conduct, the private party's acts will be
16. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), in which the Court focused
on the nature of the activity the private actor engaged in. In Marsh, the Court held that
a state cannot "impose criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to distribute
religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town contrary to the wishes of
the management." Id. at 506. The nature of the company-owned town was no different
from any municipal town; thus, it would also be subject to the antidiscriminatory re-
straints of the Constitution. See id. at 507.
18. See id. at 506.
19. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the operation of
a privately owned utility licensed and regulated by the state was held not to be perform-
ance of a public function. Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court has found state action
present in the exercise by a private entity of "powers traditionally exclusively reserved to
the State." Id. at 352. The Court found that providing utility services is not a traditional
function of the state because the state is not obliged to provide such services; thus, the
Court rejected the public function analysis as applied to utility companies. Id. at 353.
In later cases, the Supreme Court also rejected the public function analysis as applied
to nursing homes. The activity must be one which the state is required to provide by
statute or state constitution. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). The Court also
rejected this approach as applied to private schools. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830 (1982). Even though the private school's income came primarily from public grants,
it was not held to be a state actor. The provision of education, while normally provided
by the state out of public funds, was not found to be the exclusive function of the state.
Id.
20. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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deemed state action and will thus be subject to constitutional
review.21
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 22 the Court addressed the
nexus approach as applied to a state regulated utility. Justice Rehn-
quist stated:
While the principle that private action is immune from the restrictions of
the Fourteenth Amendment is well established and easily stated, the ques-
tion whether particular conduct is "private," on the one hand, or "state
action," on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer. . . It may well
be that acts of a heavily regulated activity with at least something of a
governmentally protected monopoly will more readily be found to be "state"
acts than will the acts of an entity lacking these characteristics. But the
inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.
2 3
In Jackson, the Court found no sufficient relationship between the
state and the utility to transform the utility's actions into state
actions.
But in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,2 4 the Court
found a sufficient involvement between the state and a private entity
to enforce compliance with the constitutional mandates of the four-
teenth amendment. In Burton, a private company ran a restaurant in
a state owned and operated parking facility, and the restaurant re-
fused to serve blacks. The Court held that sufficient involvement ex-
isted between the state and the restaurant as to demand compliance
with the antidiscriminatory restraints of the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Clark held that if the state "has so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence. . .that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity. . .[that activity] cannot be
considered to be so purely private as to fall without the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'2 Thus, the test for the nexus analysis is
whether a significant involvement exists between the state and the
private actor; this will always turn on the facts of each individual
21. In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Supreme Court held that pri-
vate, racially restrictive covenants in real estate sales do not violate the fourteenth
amendment, but that state court enforcement of those restrictive covenants does violate
the amendment. The state enforcement of the covenant was the nexus that connected the
state to the discriminatory conduct. Enforcement of the restriction was a sufficient in-
volvement to apply the constitutional guarantees. Id. at 13-14.
22. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
23. Id. at 349-51 (emphasis added).
24. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
25. Id. at 725. Some of the criteria the Court found convincing leading to this
holding include that the land and building were publicly owned, and that public funds
paid for the maintenance of the building. Id. at 723-24.
case.
B. Limiting of the State Action Doctrine in the 1980s: The 1982
State Action Trilogy
The scope of the state action doctrine was curtailed by three Su-
preme Court decisions in 1982: Blum v. Yaretsky,26 Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn,27 and Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 28 In Blum, the Court
held that privately owned nursing homes reimbursed by the state
were not state actors for purposes of fourteenth amendment claims.
Justice Rehnquist wrote:
[A] State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when
it has exercised a coercive power or has provided such significant encour-
agement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be
that of the State. Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a
private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible [under
the] Fourteenth Amendment.
29
Thus, the mere receipt of state funds does not make the state action
label attach.
In Rendell-Baker, the Court held that a private school funded pri-
marily from public funds and regulated by public authorities could
not be considered a state actor. The school's receipt of public funds
did not make the school a state actor.30 Further, the extensive regu-
lation by the state was also insufficient to make the school a state
actor.31
In Lugar, the Court found the state action requirement to be met
when a private party jointly participated with state officials in the
seizure of disputed property under a procedurally defective statute.32
26. 457 U.S. 991 (1982). Medicaid patients "objected to the involuntary discharge
or transfer... by their nursing homes without certain procedural safeguards." Id. at
1003.
27. 457 U.S. 830 (1982). Teachers in a private school brought suit claiming they
had been fired in violation of their constitutional rights to free speech and procedural due
process. Id. at 834-35.
28. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). Plaintiffs claimed that creditors took advantage of state
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute to allow attachment of property without due
process.
29. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05.
30. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840. These public funds were given to the school
because it acted as a contractor for services, educating those students who were exper-
iencing difficulties in the public school system. Chief Justice Burger noted that "[a]cts of
such private contractors do not become acts of the government by reason of their signifi-
cant or even total engagement in performing public contracts." Id. at 841.
31. Id. at 841-42. The public function approach was also inapplicable, because
under Jackson it was mandated that the function must be the traditional exclusive func-
tion of the state. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. While education is an impor-
tant function that the state usually provides, no state is required by the United States
Constitution to provide education.
32. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942. Justice White was careful to limit the holding to those
contexts in which the state has created a system whereby state officials attach property
on the ex parte application of one party to a private dispute. For the discussion of Shel-
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Therefore, this trilogy of cases stands for the proposition that
neither state funding nor state regulation, without more, is enough to.
command a state actor determination, and that significant joint par-
ticipation between the state and the private party is essential for the
state actor label to attach.
C. The State Action Doctrine as Applied to the NCAA
From 1974 through 1982, federal appellate courts unanimously
held that NCAA action was state action and therefore subject to the
standards of the fourteenth amendment.3 3 However, with the limita-
tions placed by the United States Supreme Court on the application
of the public function and the nexus approaches in the 1982 state
action trilogy,34 the federal courts reexamined their approaches, and
all circuits held that NCAA actions were not state actions. The Ne-
vada Supreme Court, in Tarkanian v. NCAA, a5 was the first court in
five years to declare the NCAA a state actor, thus ripening the issue
for review by the United States Supreme Court.
1. NCAA Action as State Action
Until 1982, the federal circuit courts relied on both the public
function analysis and the nexus or entanglement analysis to deter-
mine that NCAA actions were state actions.36 The public function
ley v. Kraemer, in which state officials acted to enforce violations of the fourteenth
amendment, see supra note 21.
33. See supra note 10.
34. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
35. 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988). This case
could have had a major impact on the NCAA. A ruling backing Tarkanian's view that
the university gave its sports-governing authority to the NCAA could have opened the
door for a myriad of lawsuits by athletes, coaches, and universities who had been disci-
plined by the NCAA.
36. For an early, optimistic view that NCAA action would continue to be seen as
state action, see Note, The NCAA, Amateurism, and the Student-Athlete's Constitu-
tional Rights Upon Ineligibility, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 597, 600-07 (1980). "In general,
the state action question is close, especially in light of the Burger Court's tendency to
restrict the applicability of state action. Nevertheless, courts faced with the issue are
decidedly finding state action on the part of the NCAA, and the weight of precedent will
assuredly continue this trend." Id. at 607.
For a brief survey of various issues raised by litigation in college athletics, see Car-
refiello, Jocks Are People Too: The Constitution Comes To The Locker Room, 13
CREIGHTON L. REV. 843 (1980). For a discussion of the inapplicability of the state action
doctrine to the NCAA in the context of constitutionally challenging student-athlete aca-
demic standards, see Comment, NCAA Eligibility Regulations And the Fourteenth
Amendment - Where Is the State Action?, 13 OHlo N.U.L. REv. 433 (1986). And for the
opposing view, see Greene, The New NCAA Rules Of The Game: Academic Integrity Or
argument approach was based on the idea that the NCAA performs
a traditional government function. The nexus or entanglement ap-
proach was based on the view that NCAA actions could be seen as
state actions by virtue of the organization's public membership,
which indicated a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the
NCAA
The public function analysis was a popular approach. In the 1975
case of Parish v. NCAA,3 s the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals used
Racism?, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 101 (1984).
37. However, even when state action was found, it was common for the NCAA
action to be upheld, usually as rationally related to a legitimate state objective. See Asso-
ciated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974). In this case, the plaintiffs
were student-athletes who gained admission to the university through alternative admis-
sions qualifications, based on economic need, motivation, and maturity. Id. at 1252. They
were not required to take either the SAT or the ACT. Id. Each of the plaintiffs were
determined to have the potential to succeed academically, despite deficiencies in their
educational background which would normally have prevented their admission under the
regular standards. Id. One of the bylaws of the NCAA limited eligibility of first year
students who had a predicted grade point average below a certain level under the NCAA
prediction tables, and either an SAT score or ACT score (along with either high school
grades or rank in class) was necessary to predict a student's grade point average. Id. at
1253. Since the plaintiffs were not required to take those standardized tests, those plain-
tiffs who did not take them did not receive high enough predictions. Id. Those plaintiffs
who did take the tests also failed to reach high enough prediction levels. Id. at 1253-54.
Due to some misunderstanding on the part of the university, each plaintiff was still certi-
fied as fully eligible to participate in athletics their freshman year. Id. at 1254. (Each
plaintiff did in fact obtain at least the minimum grade point average his first year. Id.)
When the NCAA found out that these players had erroneously been determined eligible,
it demanded that the university declare the students as ineligible. Id. Rather than face
stiff sanctions from the NCAA, the university did as it was told. Id. Plaintiffs brought
suit and won a temporary restraining order; the NCAA appealed. Id. However, the
NCAA's rule regarding eligibility was upheld because it was shown to bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate purpose. Id. at 1255.
See also Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977). In this
case, student athletes were charged with violating various provisions of the NCAA rules,
including the sale of complimentary tickets, use of administrators' telephone lines for
personal long-distance calls, use of coaches' automobiles for personal transportation, and
use of free lodging during basketball camp. Id. at 359. The NCAA declared the students
ineligible to play, and imposed sanctions on the university, including a probation period
with no post-season play and no television coverage for any sports. Id. at 361. The stu-
dents claimed that the NCAA had not afforded them due process before they were de-
clared ineligible. Id. at 363. The court of appeals determined, however, that the investi-
gations and hearings were fair, impartial, and complete, and that the evidence justified
the NCAA's conclusions. Id. at 367.
38. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975). In this case, the plaintiffs were basketball play-
ers who were granted eligibility by their college even though the students did not meet
the minimum grade point averages required by the NCAA. Id. at 1030. When the
NCAA found out, it imposed sanctions against the school. Id. at 1031. The students
brought action against the NCAA under a claim of denial of due process and equal
protection. Id. A temporary restraining order was issued, but it lapsed when the team
failed to receive any post-season invitations. Id. The NCAA's motion to dismiss was
granted, because the restriction on grades was minimally related to a legitimate state
purpose, and thus was permissible. Id. at 1031-34. Other cases have used the public
function analysis to put constitutional restraints on the NCAA. See Howard Univ. v.
NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Buckston v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D.
Mass. 1973). "The N.C.A.A. in supervising and policing the majority of intercollegiate
[VOL. 26: 953, 1989] NCAA v. Tarkanian
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
this analysis to find the NCAA a state actor. The court noted that
the state government had a traditional interest in all aspects of edu-
cation, and that organized athletics were an important part of this
educational system.39 Once college athletics became national in
scope, the NCAA undertook the task of coordinating and regulating
the system, and thus, was performing a traditional government
function.
40
This approach, however, does not seem to fit with the United
States Supreme Court decisions requiring that the state action label
be affixed to private actors only when performing a function belong-
ing exclusively to the state,41 and only when the state is actually
required to perform the function.42 Education is not an exclusive
government function, and its provision is not required from any
state; therefore, the later cases contended that the public function
approach was destined to fail in this context.
In addition to the public function approach, the federal courts of
appeals also relied upon entanglement analysis. In the 1975 case of
Howard University v. NCAA, 43 the District of Columbia Circuit
athletics and athletes nationwide performs a public function, sovereign in nature, sub-
ject[ing] it to constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 1156.
39. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032.
40. Id. The court stated, "in light of the national... scope of collegiate athletics
and the traditional governmental concern with the educational system, [if] the NCAA
were to disappear tomorrow, government would soon step in to fill the void." Id. at 1033.
The court emphasized that a state should not be allowed to sidestep constitutional re-
strictions by forming or supporting private organizations in which they have placed a
part of their governmental power. Id.
41. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); see also supra notes
17-20 and accompanying text.
42. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); see also supra notes 17-20 and ac-
companying text.
43. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In this case, a private university and one of its
athletes sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the NCAA, alleging that their
constitutional rights had been abridged. Id. at 214. Certain members of the university
soccer team, including one plaintiff, had been found by the NCAA to have participated
in intercollegiate competitions and NCAA championships while ineligible under NCAA
rules. Id. The NCAA had conducted an investigation' of the university, and found that
two of its student-athletes had violated its foreign student rule, which reduces eligibility
for each year a student played in a foreign country. Id. at 215. In addition, one student
was found to have violated the five-year rule, which mandates that the student may only
remain eligible for five years from the date of matriculation in the university. Id. Fur-
thermore, some students were found to be receiving financial aid when their grade point
averages were below the required minimum. Id. In addition to holding that the NCAA
action could be classified as state action, the court held that the foreign student rule
violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 222. The court, while enjoining further en-
forcement of the foreign student rule, upheld the NCAA sanctions imposed upon the
school because both the five-year rule and the minimum grade point average rule had a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the NCAA's legislation. Id.
Court of Appeals found state action by the NCAA based upon the
state's involvement with the NCAA. The court relied upon the size,
influence, and wealth of the NCAA to conclude that even private
institutions following NCAA policies had engaged in the requisite
degree of state action to require constitutional restraint."4 Some of
the factors the court found convincing were: that approximately one-
half of the NCAA's members were state or federally supported; that
public schools provided the vast majority of the NCAA's capital;
and that the public schools were a dominant force in determining
NCAA policy and in dictating NCAA actions.45 The court noted
that while a private university was not itself a governmental institu-
tion, its athletic and educational affairs were affected by the con-
certed action of the many state institutions that participate as
NCAA members in the promulgation and enforcement of the
NCAA rules." Since this state involvement was pervasive, if injuries
arose, they were in effect caused by these institutions.4 7 This ap-
proach was doomed because it did not fit with the Supreme Court
decisions requiring a sufficiently close nexus between the state and
the challenged activity.48
2. NCAA Action as Private Action: The Public
Function and Nexus Approaches Disapproved
The Supreme Court has steadily narrowed its definition of what is
state action and who is a state actor. For example, in the state action
trilogy of cases discussed above, private institutions, even when sup-
ported almost exclusively by public funds, did not meet the definition
of a state actor.49 In light of the Court's shift in the 1982 cases, the
federal circuit courts followed suit and consistently found that ac-
tions by the NCAA do not constitute state action.
In the 1984 case of Arlosoroff v. NCAA,50 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, relying on the 1982 trilogy, was the first appellate
court to hold that the NCAA was not a state actor. While recogniz-
ing the directly contrary holdings of many other circuits,"' the court
held that these earlier cases rested upon the theory that indirect in-
volvement of state governments could convert what otherwise would
44. Id. at 218.
45. Id. at 219-20.
46. Id. at 216-17.
47. Id. at 217.
48. E.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
49. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
50. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
51. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Howard
Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA,
493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974).
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be considered private conduct into state action; a theory the Fourth
Circuit believed the Supreme Court to have rejected in its 1982 deci-
sions.52 The court concluded that no state action was present.
It is not enough that an institution is highly regulated and subsidized by a
state. If the state in its regulatory or subsidizing function does not order or
cause the action complained of, and the function is not one traditionally
reserved to the state, there is no state action.
53
After noting that no precise formula was available to determine
whether state action exists, the court suggested that the proper in-
quiry should be whether the action is fairly attributable to the
state.54 The court considered the fact that the membership of the
NCAA consisted of fifty percent state institutions, but noted that
this fact did not change the NCAA's basic character as a private
association.55 Recognizing that the association served somewhat of a
public function by introducing order into college athletics, the court
quoted Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.56 to support its holding
that state action must consist of a function which is exclusively re-
served to the state.57 Further support for the exclusivity requirement
was offered by Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,58 which held that simply per-
forming a function that serves the public is not state action. All of
the tests used by the Supreme Court for measuring state action seem
to require a closer connection between the state and the NCAA.
The First Circuit soon followed suit in the 1985 case of Ponce v.
Basketball Federation of Comm. of P.R.59 That court concluded
that the criteria established by the Supreme Court precluded a find-
ing of state action where there was no evidence that the government
encouraged or affirmatively induced the challenged conduct.60 The
Sixth Circuit also followed this trend in the 1986 case of Graham v.
52. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021.
53. Id. at 1022 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 1021.
55. Id.
56. 419 U.S. 345 (1974); see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text; see also
supra note 19.
57. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021.
58. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
59. 760 F.2d 375 (Ist Cir. 1985). Although Ponce did not involve the NCAA, a
similar and thus analogous association was held not to be a state actor.
60. Id. at 378. The First Circuit had already moved in this direction in Spath v.
NCAA, 728 F.2d 25 (st Cir. 1984). In Spath, however, the court did not have to rule
directly on the issue since the school involved was a publicly supported university, which
was also named as a codefendant; the school itself was held to be responsible for the
violation.
NCAA.6 1 In Graham, the plaintiff failed to show either that- the
NCAA served a traditional government function or that the state in
any way caused, controlled, or directed the NCAA's actions.62 The
Sixth Circuit again examined the issue in the 1987 case of Karma-
nos v. Baker.3 In Karmanos, the court was convinced that no state
action existed because the plaintiff failed to show that the state uni-
versity either caused or procured the adoption of NCAA rules, and
therefore, sufficient state involvement was not shown.
3. Nevada Supreme Court Holds
NCAA Action is State Action
Contrary to the weight of the federal circuit court authority, the
Nevada Supreme Court, in Tarkanian v. NCAA, 4 decided that the
NCAA was indeed a state actor. The court recognized that the ra-
tionale underlying the early cases was that many NCAA member
institutions were publicly supported.6 5 However, the Nevada court
disagreed with the federal courts' interpretation of the 1982 Su-
preme Court trilogy, and therefore propounded a different result. 6
The court acknowledged that cases subsequent to the state action
trilogy17 rejected the earlier line of cases holding that NCAA activ-
ity is state action.6" However, the Nevada court argued that the Su-
preme Court trilogy did not require the results that occurred in sub-
sequent cases.6 9 While the later cases argued that education was not
a traditional, exclusive government function (thus, not fitting the test
posited by the Supreme Court), the Nevada court contended that the
right to discipline public employees was the traditional, exclusive
prerogative of the state.70 Therefore, the court felt that a university
could not escape responsibility for its disciplinary duties by delegat-
ing those tasks to a private entity, the NCAA 1
The Nevada Supreme Court distinguished the federal cases hold-
ing contrary on the grounds that many of them involved private uni-
versities.72 As for the cases involving state universities, they were dis-
61. 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986).
62. Id. at 958.
63. 816 F.2d. 258 (6th Cir. 1987).
64. 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
65. Id. at 333, 741 P.2d at 1347.
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
68. Tarkanian, 103 Nev. at 335, 741 P.2d at 1348.
69. Id. at 336, 741 P.2d at 1348.
70. Id. Deciding which governmental function the court was actually looking at
seems to be the key issue here. The Nevada court never tried to assert that education was
an exclusive government function.
71. Tarkanian, 103 Nev. at 336, 741 P.2d at 1348.
72. Id. at 337, 741 P.2d at 1349. Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir.
1984), involved the applicability of eligibility requirements to a Duke University tennis
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tinguished on the grounds that the plaintiffs were students rather
than state employees, such as Coach Tarkanian.7a
II. THE NCAA AND COACH TARKANIAN'S SUIT
A. The Structure of the NCAA
The NCAA is an unincorporated association of approximately 960
members, including virtually all of the public and private universities
and colleges in the United States with major athletic programs."
The NCAA has a constitution longer than the United States Consti-
tution. 5 The NCAA's Constitution gives to the NCAA the power to
player.
73. Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986), involved students who
claimed that the NCAA transfer regulations violated their constitutional rights. Graham
did not deal with the enforcement of NCAA rules against a state employee, as did
Tarkanian, and thus, Graham is clearly distinguishable.
74. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 457. For a general understanding of the operation of
the NCAA, see Martin, The NCAA and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 383, 389-92 (1976).
75. The NCAA Constitution lists its purposes:
(a) To initiate, stimulate and improve intercollegiate athletics programs for
student-athletes and to promote and develop educational leadership, physical
fitness, sports participation as a recreational pursuit and athletic excellence;
(b) To uphold the principle of institutional control of, and responsibility for,
all intercollegiate sports in conformity with the constitution and bylaws of this
Association;
(c) To encourage its members to adopt eligibility rules to comply with satis-
factory standards of scholarship, sportsmanship and amateurism;
(d) To formulate, copyright and publish rules of play governing intercollegi-
ate sports;
(e) To preserve intercollegiate athletics records;
(f) To supervise the conduct of, and to establish eligibility standards for,
regional and national athletics events under the auspices of this Association;
(g) To cooperate with other amateur athletics organizations in promoting
and conducting national and international athletics events;
(h) To legislate, through bylaws or by a resolution of a Convention, upon
any subject of general concern to the members in the administration of inter-
collegiate athletics; and
(i) To study in general all phases of competitive intercollegiate athletics and
establish standards whereby the colleges and universities of the United States
can maintain their athletics activities on a high level.
NCAA CONST. art. 2, § 1, reprinted in 1988-89 NCAA MANUAL 7. The fundamental
policies of the NCAA are also set out in its constitution as follows:
(a) The competitive athletics programs of the colleges are designed to be a
vital part of the educational system. A basic purpose of this Association is to
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational pro-
gram and the athlete as an integral part of the student body, and, by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between college athletics and professional
sports.
(b) Legislation governing the conduct of intercollegiate athletics programs of
create "legislation" to govern all intercollegiate sports of member in-
stitutions.76 Approximately one-half of these member institutions are
state funded schools, which pay dues to the NCAA.7 7 Since it has a
monopoly over college athletics, any college or university that wants
to be a "big name" sports school is, for all practical purposes, forced
to join the NCAA. 78 According to the NCAA Constitution, these
schools must enforce the rules and regulations of the NCAA.7 1 This
presents a problem for state funded schools: if the NCAA's acts are
not considered to be state actions when it engages in the regulation
of state school athletics, it will not be held accountable if it commits
what otherwise would be a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Every athlete's claim must cross the state action threshold in order
to have his or her grievance considered by the courts.8 0
B. Background and Facts of NCAA v. Tarkanian
The University of Nevada is a public institution of higher learning
which is financed by the state of Nevada.8 ' The University of Ne-
vada, Las Vegas (UNLV) is one branch of the state funded Univer-
sity of Nevada."2 The University is organized and operated accord-
ing to the Nevada Constitution, statutes, and regulations.8 3 Official
functions of the executives of UNLV are, of course, state actions.
8 4
UNLV is a member of the NCAA. 5 As a member of the NCAA,
it contractually agrees to administer its athletic program in accor-
dance with NCAA legislation. 6 The responsibility for administering
member institutions shall apply to basic athletics issues such as admissions,
financial aid, eligibility and recruiting; member institutions shall be obligated
to apply and enforce this legislation, and the enforcement program of the Asso-
ciation shall be applied to an institution when it fails to fulfill this obligation.
NCAA CONST. art. 2, § 2, reprinted in 1988-89 NCAA MANUAL 7-8.
76. NCAA CONST. art. 2, § 1(h), reprinted in 1988-89 NCAA MANUAL 7; see
supra note 75.
77. Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152, 1157 (D. Mass. 1973).
78. In order to operate a large-scale intercollegiate athletic program on an eco-
nomically sound basis, membership in the NCAA may be a practical necessity.
79. NCAA CONST. art. 2, § 2(b), reprinted in 1988-89 NCAA MANUAL #8. See
supra note 75 for the applicable enforcement provisions.
80. See infra notes 117-26 and accompanying text.





86. Id. The NCAA Constitution provides:
Legislation governing the conduct of intercollegiate athletics programs of mem-
ber institutions shall apply to basic athletics issues such as admissions, financial
aid, eligibility and recruiting; member institutions shall be obligated to apply
and enforce this legislation, and the enforcement program of the Association
shall be applied to an institution when it fails to fulfill this obligation.
NCAA CONST. art. 2, § 2(b), reprinted in 1988-89 NCAA MANUAL 8 (emphasis
added).
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the NCAA enforcement program is delegated to the NCAA Com-
mittee on Infractions. 7 It supervises an investigative staff and makes
factual determinations concerning alleged rule violations.,, If it finds
a violation, this committee is authorized to impose an appropriate
penalty, or recommend suspension or termination of the school's
membership in the NCAA.89 If the violation is serious, the NCAA
may apply several severe sanctions. 90
Jerry Tarkanian became the head basketball coach at UNLV in
1973. 91 Prior to his joining the staff, the team had a losing record.92
Four years later, the team placed third in the NCAA national cham-
pionship.93 However, in 1977, officials at UNLV notified Tarkanian
that they were going to suspend him. 4 The NCAA had questioned
UNLV's athletic program, and subsequent to its investigation, the
NCAA alleged that UNLV had infracted thirty-eight NCAA
rules. 5 Ten of these infractions allegedly involved Tarkanian.9
The Committee on Infractions proposed sanctions against UNLV,
including a two year probation period during which its basketball
team could not participate in post-season tournaments or appear on
television.9 7 The Committee also requested UNLV to discipline
87. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 457; see also NCAA CONST. art. 4, § 6, reprinted in
1988-89 NCAA MANUAL 34-35.
88. Official Procedure Governing The NCAA Enforcement Program, §§ 2-4,
NCAA MANUAL 238-43 (1988).
89. Id.; see § 4(b)(3).
90. Among these disciplinary measures are reprimands and censures, probation for
one year or more, ineligibility for NCAA championship events, ineligibility for post-
season play, ineligibility for television coverage, prohibitions against intercollegiate com-
petition, prohibitions against recruitment, and reductions in financial aid awards allowed.
Id.; see § 7, at 245. Some of these measures are unquestionably harsh, but surely some-
times deserved.
91. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 456. For an interesting account of the trials and
tribulations of Coach Tarkanian, see Dexter, Rebel With a Cause, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Dec. 8, 1986, at 80; see also Callahan, Making Its Points The Hard Way; Dealt a
Difficult Hand, Las Vegas Draws From the Discards, TIME, Mar. 2, 1987, at 59.
92. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 456.-
93. Id.
94. Id. They were very happy with his performance as head coach. He was de-
scribed as the "winningest active basketball coach." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. UNLV, with the help of both private counsel and the Nevada Attorney
General, conducted an investigation and denied all of the allegations, and specifically
determined that Tarkanian had committed no violations. They presented their conclu-
sions during hearings with the NCAA's Committee on Infractions. The Committee de-
cided that indeed, many of its allegations could not be supported by the evidence, but it
did find 38 violations of NCAA rules, with 10 violations supposedly committed by
Tarkanian. Id. at 456-59.
97. Id. at 459.
Coach Tarkanian by removing him completely from the University's
athletic program during the probation; more sanctions were
threatened if UNLV did not do so."a UNLV appealed the Commit-
tee's proposed sanctions to the NCAA Council.99 After hearing ar-
guments from all sides, the Council approved the Committee's find-
ings and adopted all of its recommended sanctions. 100
Subsequent to the Council's approval, the executives of UNLV
were forced to decide whether they would apply the recommended
sanctions. 101 The school officials had three options: first, they could
reject the sanction requiring the severance of Tarkanian from the
athletic program, and take the risk of even heavier sanctions; second,
even though they thought the NCAA was incorrect in its ruling,
they could reassign Tarkanian, even though he was tenured, to a dif-
ferent position for the duration of the probation; and finally, they
could pull out of the NCAA completely.102 Although they expressed
doubts concerning the sufficiency of the evidence on which the rec-
ommendations were formed, 03 they concluded that, given the
mandatory adherence to NCAA regulations, they could not substi-
tute their findings for those of the NCAA. 04 The president of the
University chose the second option, and notified Tarkanian that he
was completely severed from all relations with the intercollegiate
program during its probation period. 105
Rather than accept his threatened demotion and drastic salary
cut, Tarkanian brought suit in Nevada, claiming that he had been
deprived of his fourteenth amendment due process rights.106






103. The university was critical of the procedures used by the NCAA and attacked
the credibility of the NCAA investigators. University of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. 389,
393, 594 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1979).
104. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 459.
105. Id.
106. For the pertinent part of the fourteenth amendment, see supra note 9.
Tarkanian sued under the Civil Rights Act. This civil rights statute states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the Dis-
trict of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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fees 1  against both the NCAA and UNLV.'0 8 The trial court en-
joined UNLV from suspending Tarkanian on the grounds that he
had been deprived of his procedural and substantive due process, and
UNLV appealed.0 9 After a four year delay, the trial judge finally
resolved the case in Tarkanian's favor." 0 The NCAA appealed to
the Nevada Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court's hold-
ing that Tarkanian had been deprived of due process prior to his
suspension."' The basis for the Nevada Supreme Court's decision
was that the NCAA was a state actor, and thus subject to the re-
strictions of the fourteenth amendment." 2 The case was appealed by
the NCAA to the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the
lower court holding in a five-to-four decision."
3
III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION IN NCAA v. TARKANIAN
The Nevada State Supreme Court held the NCAA to have en-
gaged in state action." 4 In reversing this holding, the United States
Supreme Court contended that the Nevada court made three incor-
rect assumptions. First, the court assumed that it was reviewing the
penalties imposed on Tarkanian, rather than proposed sanctions
against UNLV." 5 Second, the court incorrectly termed the NCAA a
107. Tarkanian filed for attorney's fees and was awarded almost $196,000, 90% of
which was to be paid by the NCAA. The attorney's fees were awarded according to the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act, which states in pertinent part: "In any action or
proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this
title... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
108. Tarkanian, 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987), revd, 109 S. Ct. 454
(1988).
109. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 459.
110. Id. at 460. The court concluded that the NCAA's conduct constituted state
action for jurisdictional and constitutional purposes, and that the NCAA's decision was
arbitrary and capricious. The court reaffirmed the earlier injunction barring UNLV from
disciplining Tarkanian, and it also enjoined the NCAA from conducting further proceed-
ings against UNLV and from taking other actions that had been recommended by the
NCAA Council. Id.
I l. Tarkanian, 103 Nev. at 333, 741 P.2d at 1346. It confirmed the injunction,
but narrowed its scope only to forbid penalties from being imposed upon Tarkanian him-
self. The court also reduced the award of attorney's fees. Id. at 340, 741 P.2d at 1352.
112. Id. at 337, 741 P.2d at 1349.
113. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion; the dissenters were Justices
White, Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor. For an example of the great amount of pub-
licity prior to this litigation, see CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 2, 1988, at A31; see also
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 12, 1988, at A35.
114. Tarkanian, 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 454
(1988).
115. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 461.
state actor due to the public financial support it received.116 Third, it
assumed that the right to discipline a public employee was tradition-
ally the exclusive prerogative of the state, thus assuming that the
state (acting through UNLV) may not escape its responsibility for
such disciplinary action by delegating that task to a private entity.1 '
Tarkanian argued that UNLV (obviously a state actor) had dele-
gated its own functions and authority to the NCAA, and the Nevada
Supreme Court reasoned that both of the entities acted jointly to
deprive Tarkanian of his rights, thus making them both state ac-
tors." 8 However, the United States Supreme Court construed the
scheme in a different way. The Court noted that in a typical state
action case, a private party has caused harm to a plaintiff, and the
question is whether the state was sufficiently involved to treat that
conduct as state action. l19 But in this case, it was UNLV-the offi-
cial state actor-which actually performed the suspension challenged
by Tarkanian. 20 The Court felt the critical question was whether
UNLV's actions in compliance with the NCAA recommendations
turned the NCAA's conduct into state action.' 2'
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, indicated that the rela-
tionship between UNLV and the NCAA was not sufficient to confer
the state actor title upon the NCAA. Stevens gave several reasons
for this holding. First, since hundreds of schools in the NCAA have
a major impact on NCAA policies, it is the collective membership,
independent of any particular state, that determines the policies to
be implemented; UNLV only played a minor role in the formulation
of NCAA policy.' 22 Second, the mere adoption of the NCAA rules
by UNLV did not transform the NCAA into a state actor; UNLV
could have promulgated its own rules and withdrawn from the
NCAA, or it could have remained a member of the NCAA and
worked through its legislative process to change those rules it
deemed unfair.'
2 3
In response to Tarkanian's "delegation" argument,2 4 the Court
116. Id. Over one-half of the NCAA member institutions are state supported
schools. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
117. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 461.
118. Id. at 462.
119. Id.
120. When a state imposes a disciplinary sanction upon one of its employees, it
must comply with the terms of the fourteenth amendment. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
121. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 462.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 463.
124. Tarkanian asserted that the NCAA's investigation, enforcement proceedings,
and punitive recommendations were state actions because UNLV had delegated its
power to perform such duties to the NCAA. Id. at 463-64. The Supreme Court has
previously held that a state may delegate authority to a private party and thereby make
him a state actor. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
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noted that UNLV had actually delegated no power to the NCAA to
take any action against a state employee. The NCAA could only
impose sanctions on the school itself, not on any one particular indi-
vidual. 125 The Court also took special note of the adversary relation-
ship between the NCAA and UNLV during the course of the litiga-
tion. Since it would be unusual for a state entity to delegate its
powers to its own opponent, the Court felt that the NCAA was not
an agent of UNLV. Justice Stevens wrote: -"[T]he NCAA is prop-
erly viewed as a private actor at odds with the State when it repre-
sents the interests of its entire membership in an investigation of one
public university.' 28
An essential element of the Court's holding that the NCAA was
not responsible for due process violations was that the NCAA em-
ploys no special governmental powers in its investigations and recom-
mendations of alleged rules violations.'2 7 The Court noted that it
would be hard to hold the NCAA to constitutional restraints of due
process when it has no power to subpoena witnesses, to impose con-
tempt sanctions, or to impose its authority over any particular
individual. 28
As additional support for his contention that the NCAA is a state
actor, Tarkanian argued that the NCAA is so powerful that schools
have no practical alternative to compliance with its demands.129 The
Court said there was no merit in that argument. A private monopoly
is not necessarily a state actor.30 Justice Stevens recognized
UNLV's desire to rank among the top college basketball teams; ob-
viously nonmembership in the NCAA would hinder the achievement
of that goal.' 3' But just because UNLV's options were not the most
positive options possible did not mean that they were nonexistent. 32
The Court concluded that it would be more appropriate to say
125. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct at 464.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 464-65.
128. Id. at 465.
129. When this case was argued before the Supreme Court, Tarkanian's attorney
said that pulling UNLV's membership from the NCAA would be a severe downfall for
the university. "The NCAA is the only game in town," the attorney said. Justice Scalia
asked, "Are you saying that the world comes to an end if you can't belong to the
NCAA?" "As a university with any kind of an athletic program it does," answered the
lawyer. "A lot of educators would be surprised to hear that," retorted Scalia. CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 12, 1988, at A36, cols. 4-5.
130. A state's conferral of a monopoly status does not convert a private party into
a state actor. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1974).
131. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465.
132. Id.
that UNLV conducted its program under NCAA policies, rather
than to say that NCAA policies were developed and conducted
under Nevada law.133 Therefore, the Court gave "the final word":
the NCAA is not a state actor for constitutional purposes.
IV. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING STATE ACTOR STATUS FOR THE
NCAA
A. The Dissenting Opinion in Tarkanian
The holding in NCAA v. Tarkanian was prompted by a narrow
majority.134 The dissenting justices would have held the NCAA to
fourteenth amendment restraints. Justice White, in writing the dis-
senting opinion, relied upon two earlier Supreme Court cases,
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.1 35 and Dennis v. Sparks,1 36 in asserting
that private parties could be held to be state actors even in cases
where the questioned act was eventually carried out by state officials.
In Adickes and Dennis, the Court held that private parties could be
found to be state actors if they jointly engaged with state officials in
the challenged action. 137 White believed that the facts clearly lead to
a conclusion that the NCAA acted jointly with UNLV in the sus-
pension of Coach Tarkanian. He stated: "[I]t was the NCAA's find-
ings that Tarkanian had violated NCAA rules, made at NCAA-con-
ducted hearings, all of which were agreed to by UNLV in its
membership agreement with the NCAA, that resulted in
Tarkanian's suspension by UNLV.' 38
Justice White indicated that the holding in Dennis would not pre-
clude the Court from holding that the NCAA was a state actor, de-
spite the fact that the NCAA did not have any power to take direct
action against Tarkanian. 3 9 In Dennis, the private parties did not
have any power against the plaintiff, but the Court still held the de-
fendants to be state actors.140 Next, White pointed out that UNLV
suspended Tarkanian because it embraced the NCAA rules gov-
erning the conduct of its athletic program and adopted the conclu-
133. Id.
134. It was a five-to-four decision. The dissenting Justices were White, Brennan,
Marshall, and O'Connor.
135. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
136. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
137. Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28; Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152.
138. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 467 (White, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. In Dennis, a state trial judge enjoined the production of minerals from oil
leases owned by the plaintiff. The injunction was later nullified on appeal as having been
illegally issued. The plaintiff sued both the judge and the defendant (a private corpora-
tion), alleging conspiracy to deprive him of due process. The Court held the corporation
to be a state actor because it willfully participated in joint action with the state's agents.
Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27.
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sions of the NCAA's hearings, as UNLV had agreed under its
NCAA membership contract. This was all Justice White felt was
necessary to show that the NCAA acted jointly with UNLV and
therefore was a state actor.14'
B. Fulflling the Policies Behind the State Action Doctrine
There are two situations where the state action problem crops up:
first, when a plaintiff wants to go after the "deep pockets," and
therefore tries to hold the state responsible for the actions of a pri-
vate party; and second, when a plaintiff wants to right a wrong com-
mitted by a "relation" of the state. In this second situation, the
plaintiff only seeks a remedy from that private party, but needs the
state action doctrine to hold that party amenable to constitutional
restraints. These two situations have corresponding public policies
which apply depending on which party the plaintiff seeks to hold re-
sponsible. As Justice White wrote in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co.:
142
Careful adherence to the "state action" requirement preserves an area of
individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial
power. It also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, respon-
sibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed. A major conse-
quence is to require the courts to respect the limits of their own power as
directed against state governments and private interests. Whether this is
good or bad policy, it is a fundamental fact of our political order.1 43
Thus, the question remaining to be asked is whether holding the
NCAA to constitutional restraints would fulfill the policies behind
the state action doctrine. The NCAA cases fall into the second type
of situation described above, because the plaintiffs seek redress from
the NCAA itself and not from the state. The policy thus applicable
to this situation is the preservation of individual freedom. As a vol-
untary private association, the NCAA arguably should be able to
choose whatever standards it desires. 4 Since its members vote when
141. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 468 (White, J., dissenting).
142. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
143. Id. at 936-37.
144. The foundation for this argument may be changing, as private clubs have
been forced to open their doors to "unwanted members," at least in the context of "men's
clubs" which have expanded to allow women. These clubs have been found in many ways
to be business settings; thus, the courts have given women access to these "networking
clubs." However, the private country clubs which restrict access to minorities have been
allowed to remained segregated, as these clubs claim to involve purely social settings, in
which they claim the right to free association. For further discussion of this issue, see
Note, Private Club Discrimination Can Be Outlawed: Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
19 U.S.F. L. REV. 413-29 (1985); see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
selecting its standards and procedures, the majority view will prevail,
ensuring a representative voice. By limiting the reach of the courts,
the NCAA will be able to further its goals and policies in the man-
ner that its members select. Therefore, the policy of individual free-
dom may not be a favorable argument for those asserting that the
NCAA is a state actor.
C. The Possibility of Improper Delegation
In a critique of Arlosoroff,145 the authors of one of the leading
texts in the area of sports law have defined an important issue:
The court's perspective on the state action issue is drawn very narrowly and
seems not to consider the most compelling claims that an athlete might
raise. The real problem in the NCAA cases may not be whether the NCAA
performs a traditional state institutional function or whether the state con-
trols the details of the NCAA's operations. Rather, the important underly-
ing issue may be one of delegation. State educational institutions present
the clearest examples. At a state school, the state has a close and continu-
ing relationship with its student-athletes. That relationship imposes certain
prerogatives and responsibilities, including a right to define eligibility. If the
state executes these itself, there should be no question that there is state
action present and that constitutional norms must be satisfied. The critical
question to be examined is whether the state's constitutional responsibility
ends when the state agrees to have standards of conduct and eligibility de-
fined in a collective venture in which it participates. It is likely that there
are limits on the extent to which the state can use the delegation device to
confine its obligations. The prospect of a continuing constitutional duty
seems especially strong in those situations in which the state agrees to have
the NCAA apply to its athletes standards devised by the latter group." 6
The state should not be allowed to avoid its constitutional require-
ments by delegating difficult or unpleasant tasks to outside private
entities. As the court in Parish v. NCAA 147 said, it is a "strange
doctrine indeed to hold that the state could avoid the restrictions
placed upon them by the Constitution by banding together to form
or support a 'private' organization to which they have relinquished
some portion of their governmental power.' 1 48 In addition, as Profes-
sor Greene so concisely puts it:
An organization that eliminates choice for private as well as state institu-
tions should be subjected to constitutional restraint. Whatever the rationale,
such a result makes sense because it recognizes an indisputable fact of ath-
609 (1984).
145. Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
146. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 1.14 (1979 & Supp.
1985). Without constitutional restraint, the potential for evasion of important duties
might otherwise be too appealing. Drug testing is a good example. If the state undertakes
to test its students itself, it must comply with constitutional mandates. Avoidance of
those duties should not be as simple as appointing the NCAA as the testing entity. Id. §
1.14, at 8 (Supp. 1985).
147. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); see also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying
text.
148. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1033.
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letic life; in the world of inter-collegiate athletics, there is but one well-kept
playing field open to colleges and universities, private or public, and the
NCAA is the groundskeeper.' 49
V. VIABLE ALTERNATIVES TO FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION
What happens when the NCAA is not held responsible for its pos-
sible constitutional violations? Is the plaintiff denied access to the
courts? One might wonder if the plaintiff has other available forums
for relief. One remedy may be to file suit against the school itself.
However, this presents problems if the university is a state institu-
tion, since damage claims against a state university and its officials
are barred by the eleventh amendment.150 The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in the 1986 case Graham v. NCAA,' 5' determined that
claims against a university are barred by our Constitution. The court
held that the eleventh amendment precludes not only actions in
which the state is directly named as a party, but also actions brought
against a state agency or state officer where the action is essentially
one for recovery of money from the state treasury.5 2 The court re-
lied upon the 1974 Supreme Court case Edelman v. Jordan,'5 3 which
barred any retroactive award which requires payment of funds from
the state treasury. The court in Edelman limited the federal courts
to providing only prospective injunctive relief against state officials
sued in their official capacity.15  The eleventh amendment, however,
does not prevent plaintiffs from bringing suits against state officials
in their individual or personal capacities. 55 Thus, since the govern-
mental immunity is not extended either to requests for injunctive re-
lief or to personal suits against the school officials, the trend of the
litigation will no doubt turn in those directions.
Another available option to ensure fair treatment is to act from
within. Much of the past litigation arose regarding disputes over en-
acted rules and regulations. Member schools have the power of vot-
149. Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or Ra-
cism?, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 101, 127 (1984).
150. The eleventh amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects
of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
151. 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986).
152. Id. at 959.
153. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
154. Id. at 677.
155. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974).
ing, with which they can change the rules and regulations of the
NCAA to a fair degree. However, when a dispute arises from a lack
of procedural fairness (such as Coach Tarkanian's claim) and unfair
investigatory tactics, no change in NCAA legislation can affect the
results. The plaintiff must resort to the legal process, but can only
look to the school for relief.
CONCLUSION
The NCAA has breathed a sigh of relief now that the United
States Supreme Court has held that the NCAA is not a state actor.
However, the need for continuing close scrutiny of the NCAA re-
mains. The theme of the litigation may be changing, as plaintiffs can
no longer rely on the fourteenth amendment for protection from the
NCAA's decisions. Injunctive relief and personal suits are still avail-
able as remedies, but these remedies must now be directed at the
schools that implement the decisions of the NCAA. The student-ath-
letes, coaches, and others under the reigns of the NCAA still have a
forum to air their dissatisfaction from the arbitrary decisions pro-
pounded by the NCAA. Limitations on the pursuit of justice may
exist, but they may be overcome.1 5
6
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156. NCAA attorney Jack Kitchen has indicated that the NCAA's legal battle
with UNLV's Coach Tarkanian may soon be settled out of court. The alleged deal re-
quires Tarkanian to pay a judgment of $21,000 and to assume responsibility for his own
legal fees. This settlement, however, does not mean that the NCAA will refrain from
placing the UNLV athletic program under sanctions. The San Diego Union, Jan. 21,
1990, at H12, col. 1.
